Analysis by
YIANNIS MAVRIS*
The sudden deterioration of the political and social climate is inevitably accelerating developments. Without exception, all the relevant indices of the Barometer registered an impressive change, while the respective percentages in most cases constitute new historical levels. The magnitude of social pessimism prevailing can now be seen more clearly following the dashing of any expectations that citizens may have harbored up to now, not only regarding the outlook for their personal financial situation, but also the future course of the economy in the near term and particularly in the long term (see tables: A, B1 & B2).
The political situation in the country has reached a turning point. The current social and electoral crisis of the two-party system is not only deepening markedly but is proving to be the gravest of those experienced in the country since the restoration of democracy in 1974. Three significant developments define the new political landscape:
First, the sharp decline in the image of the prime minister and the government. This is confirmed most clearly by the plummeting popularity of George Papandreou (-9%), which for the first time has fallen to the level of Antonis Samaras (with positive opinions for both now standing at 35%), and the loss of first position in the ranking of political leaders’ popularity to George Karatzaferis. A similar slump can be seen in satisfaction with the government (-7%), with government competence (-5%), the popularity of the ruling party (-6%), and the index of party identification with PASOK (-5%) (see tables: A, B1 & B2).
Second, the vote estimate for the ruling party has fallen sharply, registering (monthly) losses of around 3% (figures 1 & 2). After a conti-nuous decline over a period of eight months, for the first time in the Barometer measurement the party’s vote estimate (35%) is slightly below the percentage that – on the basis of the new electoral law in force – would allow it to form a majority government, since the afo-resaid estimate translates into just 149 seats in the 300-member House.
Moreover, this would be the case on the (extremely favorable for the leading party) condition that the parties which are not elected to Parliament account for the very high figure of 11.5%, as currently estimated by Public Issue. However, given the present voting fluidity, such an eventuality can by no means be considered certain. The uncertainty is heightened also by the widespread intention to abstain that has been recorded (34.5%), which – again – no one knows if this will be confirmed when the time comes to vote. Although the three small recently founded parties, with the percentages they have registered so far (Ecologist Greens 2.5%, Democratic Left 2.5%, Democratic Alliance 2%) may not have secured their representation in the next parliament, this possibility remains wide open and can under no circumstances be ruled out. If this happens, it will make the position of the first party even more difficult. (For example, if we accept, hypothetically, a variation of the present relative strength of the political parties, with the three small parties not represented in parliament, then the seats of the 1st party, garnering 35% of the vote, would number just 140). Under such circumstances, it is exceptionally difficult to forecast the outcome of a possible electoral battle in the immediate future. If the possibility arises of early elections being called, it will probably be the result of an involuntary or irrational choice.
Third, the sharp rise of the right-wing LAOS party (+3%), whose vote estimate for the first time reaches almost 9%, undoubtedly an indication of the growing trend toward the conservatization of the electorate. The party of George Karatzaferis is clearly benefiting from the present conjuncture (immigrants’ hunger strike, murder of two police officers) that strengthens the demand for ‘Law and Order’, but its rise cannot be attributed to this alone. LAOS is attempting to ‘wedge’ itself more permanently between the two big parties (something that is beginning to become apparent in the switches in party allegiance) and court the so-called ‘in-between’ electorate. The consequences of this undertaking are certain to be wide-ranging. Primarily, however, it is affecting the main opposition conservative New Democracy party, by blocking its dynamic.
*Political scientist, PhD, President & CEO of Public Issue
Date of publication: 13/03/2011
Publication: Newspaper “KATHIMERINI”